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participated in this online research. After they recalled a memory (either moral, immoral 
or neutral) they were asked to donate money to charity or put it in a lottery for their own 
gain. With an ANOVA it was examined whether remembering past behavior and current 
norms influenced donating behavior. The results where non-significant. This could suggest 
that there are specific conditions in which a memory of a past behavior or a norm should 
comply to give the results of previous findings. 
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Donating and Self-interest. The Influence of (Im)moral Behavior and Norms. 
  In our current society, a lot of charities rely on donations. Those donations often 
have to be provided by the members of a society. Although people donate a lot, it often is 
not enough, and new ways are sought to convince people why donating is important. People 
often have different reasons to donate. Attitude, moral norms and past behavior are all good 
predictors for future intentions to donate. (Knowles, Hyde & White, 2012). Donating also 
increase happiness, and because happier people often tend to donate more than unhappy 
people this creates a vicious circle (Anik, Aknin, Norton & Dunn, 2009). Not all people 
donate equal amounts or with the same frequency. The people who are most likely to donate 
are often older females with children (Lee & Chang, 2007). The current research will add 
to this information by researching if recalling moral and immoral behavior leads to more 
donating behavior when influenced by descriptive norms. The research question will be: 
Does moral and immoral behavior have an effect on charitable behavior when it is 
influenced by descriptive norms?  
Norms 
Sometimes donating is influenced by the current norms. In our everyday lives, we are 
confronted with norms on a daily basis. Norms are not easy to understand because they are 
often misunderstood and confused due to the fact that there are different types of norms, 
like prescriptive norms and descriptive norms, what should be done and what is been done 
(Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990).   
Prescriptive norms. The prescriptive norms, also called injunctive norms, are the norms 
one should follow. According to the research by Brauer and Chaurand (2010) people often 
feel the need to comply to prescriptive norms because they are scared for social sanctions. 
This effect is stronger when a behavior is more deviant. Prescriptive norms can be found 
in laws, but also in simple customs like not eating with your mouth open. Because of this, 
we hypothesize H1: The amount donated by a participant increases when the descriptive 
norm says you have to donate in comparison to when there is no norm. 
Descriptive norms. The descriptive norm is what is currently done (Cialdini et al., 1990). 
A descriptive norm is often equal to the prescriptive norm but sometimes they contradict 
each other, for example you should donate blood yet a lot of people do not do this (Cialdini 
et al., 1990). The more the prescriptive norm is violated how more likely people are to 
violate the norm themselves and thus follow the descriptive norm (If you see that a lot of 
people litter you are more likely to litter yourself then when just one person litters; Cialdini 
et al., 1990). Previous research has found that when the prescriptive and descriptive norm 
contradict each other people tend to follow the descriptive norm (Keizer, Lindenberg & 
Steg, 2008). Because of this, we hypothesize H2: The amount donated by a participant is 
lower when the descriptive norm says you do not have to donate in comparison to when 
the descriptive norms says you have to donate. For the current research, we want to see if 
moral and immoral behavior have any influence on the effects of descriptive norms. 
Moral and Immoral Behavior  
In their everyday live people behave both moral and immoral. Behaving moral is what most 
people see as good behavior while immoral behavior is seen as bad behavior. This would 
suggest that people behave moral all the time. However this is not the case. Ordóñez and 
Welsh (2015) found for example that when people set goals for themselves they are more 
likely to cheat and thus behave immoral. When people behave immoral there is a chance 
moral self-licensing and moral cleansing might occur. 
Moral self-licensing. Individuals who are reminded of their moral past behavior are less 
likely to engage in pro social behavior, like donating (Merritt, Effron & Monin, 2010; 
Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009) and are more likely to engage in behavior that serves self-
interest, like participating in a lottery. This effect is called moral self‐licensing. Moral self-
licensing occurs under different circumstances but occurs mostly when someone is actively 
looking for something to proof that they are not immoral (Effron & Conway, 2015). Effron 
and Monin (2010) for example found that moral licensing occurred when it was absolutely 
clear that the moral behavior was in another domain then the immoral behavior (this means 
licensing occurs when you kick a dog after you donated to a children’s charity but it will 
not occur when you steal money from a child after you donated to a children charity). They 
also found that when it was not completely clear that the behavior was moral, moral self-
licensing occurred in all circumstances. Meaning that when the behavior is clearly moral, 
self-licensing happened in another domain, but when it was not completely clear whether 
or not the behavior was moral, self-licensing happened in both the same domain as the 
moral behavior and in another domain. One of the theories that is suggest by Merritt et al. 
(2010) states that people build “credit points” by behaving moral and feel like they can use 
those points to act immoral. Because of this, we hypothesize H3: Being reminded of moral 
behavior creates self-licensing and reduces donating in comparison to being reminded of 
neutral behavior. 
Moral cleansing. Moral self-licensing is very similar to moral cleansing. But instead of 
how past moral behavior influences current behavior, moral cleansing focuses on how past 
immoral behavior influences current behavior. So, when you behave immoral you are more 
likely to make yourself feel better by behaving moral. This moral behavior could for 
example be donating after immoral behavior (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 
2000). When someone behaves immoral they are more likely to act more moral and pro 
social afterwards then when someone behaves neutral. Based on the research of Jordan, 
Mullen and Murnighan (2011) it is also more likely that recalling immoral behavior leads 
to compensating for the immoral behavior instead of consistent behavior. Meaning that 
people who act immoral do not continue their behavior but are seeking for a way to 
compensate their immoral behavior. 
There are three types of moral cleansing: restitution, behavioral and symbolic (West & 
Zhong, 2015). Restitution moral cleansing is making right the thing you did wrong (When 
you tell a lie, you make up for it by telling the truth). Behavioral cleansing is trying to erase 
the immoral behavior by behaving more moral and pro social in another situation (When 
you tell a lie, you make up for it by helping someone). Symbolic cleansing has nothing to 
do with how someone acts but more with symbolic cleaning yourself from guilt based on 
immoral behavior (When you lie, you make up for it by washing your hands). In the current 
research, we will mostly focus on behavioral cleansing. Because of the moral cleansing 
effect, we hypothesize H4: Being reminded of immoral behavior increases donating in 
comparison to being reminded of neutral behavior. 
Norms, Moral and Immoral Behavior  
Based on the combined previous findings it is likely that both current norms and past 
behavior influence donating and thus moral behavior. The strongest effect of this research 
can be expected to be the influence of remembering past moral and immoral behavior on 
donating. It is, however very likely that descriptive norms for self-interest will influence 
this effect. Recalling immoral behavior will strengthen the moral cleansing effect        
(Figure 1) and recalling immoral behavior will weaken the moral self-licensing effect 
(Figure 2) Because of this we hypothesize H5: Being reminded of moral behavior decreases 
donating more when the descriptive norm states that you should go for self-interest instead 
of donating. We also hypothesize H6: Being reminded of immoral behavior increases 
donating more when the norms state you should donate then when they state that you 
should go for self-interest.  
Figure 1. Effect of moral behavior on donating 
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Figure 2. Effect of immoral behavior on donating 
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This makes the main goal of the current research to explore if the effect of moral and 
immoral behavior on charitable behavior is influenced by descriptive norms. The current 
moral behavior Amount Donated 
Immoral behavior 
Amount Donated 
Descriptive norms 
for Self interest 
Descriptive norms 
for Self interest 
research is important because research has been done about moral self-licensing and moral 
cleaning, but never in combination with norms, even though norms are all around us. 
Norms steer large parts of our daily lives and in this research, we are going to find out if 
they have a moderating effect on donating. It is also important because both moral licensing 
and moral cleansing do not always occur. With this research, we hope to get more insight 
in when it does occur.  
It is important for charities to know why people donate. With this research, some light 
should be shed on the influence of descriptive norms and (im)moral behavior 
 
Method 
Participants and Design  
 The 452 participants contributing to this research were recruited online and randomly 
assigned to either the moral (n = 146), immoral (n = 151) or neutral (n = 155) condition. 
After excluding 48 participants of whom most did not score well enough on the emotion 
manipulation check, we were left with 404 participants.  
  The 48 participants were excluded because they did not met the criteria we had set 
up for the current research. For immoral behavior this criteria was a score of one on the 
positive emotions (happiness, good feeling about themselves, pleasure, satisfaction and 
pride) and at least a score of three on one of the negative emotions (sadness, guilt, disgust, 
shame, bad feeling about themselves, anger and fear). This was to ensure that the 
participants really felt immoral about their behavior. For the moral condition this was a 
score of one on the negative emotions and a score of at least three on the positive emotions. 
This was to ensure that the participants felt moral about their behavior and in some cases 
exclude negative coexisting emotions. No one was excluded from the neutral condition. 
  Of the remaining 404 participants, 131 where in the moral condition, 118 in the 
immoral condition and 155 in the control condition. All participants were from the USA. 
All were between the ages of 19 and 76 (M= 39.37, SD= 11.697). The participants were 
almost equally divided between males (47.8%) and females (52.2%). Most participants 
completed college (58.7 %), followed by completed high school (31.2%) and graduate 
school (10.1%). The independent variables will be; the descriptive, prescriptive and no 
norms and; immoral, moral or neutral behavior. Resulting in a 3x3 design. The dependent 
variable will be the amount donated to charity. 
Procedure 
On March 27 2017 the participants took the survey online on their computers or any other 
device. On the website of Mturk, the participants started with signing the informed consent. 
In the informed consent, it was emphasized that the research is completely anonymous and 
voluntary. After this, the participants were required to fill in some demographic 
information, like age, gender and level of education. Then, they wrote down either a moral, 
immoral of neutral act they had committed in the past (Jordan et al., 2011). Following, 
there was a short cover-up task which was also a manipulation check. In this task the 
participants had to indicate how they felt after writing down this act. After this, the 
participants were told that this was the end of the experiment. After ‘the end’ of the 
experiment, participants had to choose if they wanted to donate or put an extra 50 cents in 
a jar to participate in a lottery1. They were offered this 50 cents in five coins of ten cents 
                                                 
1 The jars were chosen based on a previous conducted study. 
and then got to decide how many of these coins went to charity or into the lottery. They 
were also informed that the chance of winning the lottery increases when you put more 
coins in the lottery jar. After they made their choice they were told that this was the real 
end of the experiment and they received a debriefing. The debriefing stated that the goal of 
the experiment was to see if there was an effect on recalling a moral or immoral memory 
on donating behavior and the influence of norms. It also thanked the participants for their 
time.  
Instruments 
The research included a questionnaire, containing items made in Qualtrics. This 
questionnaire included different subjects. These subjects were demographic information, 
SES, a recalling task, a cover-up task and the donating task 2 .                 .            
Demographic information. The demographic information in the current research where 
several items meant to get more information about the participants. This items included; 
age, gender and level of education.  
Socioeconomic status task. In the socioeconomic status task, participants were asked to 
imagine a ladder. On this ladder the people who were most successful in life where on top 
of the ladder, at place 10. The people least successful in life where on the bottom on place 
1. The participants where then asked where they thought they belonged on this ladder 
compared to other US citizens. This was based on the research of Cohen, Alper, Adler, 
Treanor and Turner (2008).   
The recall task. In the recall task, participants had to recall and write down an act they 
committed in the past. They were asked to recall an event when they did something that 
                                                 
2 Due to collaboration on this research other subjects where tested as well but these subjects were ignored 
in the current research. 
was either moral, immoral or neutral. This is based on the research of Jordan et al. (2011). 
With this task, there were three conditions. In the first condition, the participants had to 
recall a moral act, in the second condition they had to recall an immoral act and in the third 
condition they had to recall a neutral act (going to the supermarket). We also asked them 
how much time has passed since this behavior.  
Cover up task and manipulation check. The participants were asked to fill in an emotion 
questionnaire which would double as a manipulation check. This emotion questionnaire 
was based on the one used by van Dillen, Enter, Peters, van Dijk and Rotteveel (2016). We 
asked the participants how they experienced the recalling task with 12 items; sadness, guilt, 
disgust, shame, bad feeling about themselves, anger, fear, happiness, good feeling about 
themselves, pleasure, satisfaction, and pride, for which they had to indicate on a 7-point 
scale (1= not at all; 7= very much) the extent in which they felt this emotion.  
Donating task. In the donating task, participants were asked to make a choice. They were 
told that they would receive 50 cents (divided in 5 coins of 10 cents). They could divide 
those coins into two jars. One jar was the donating jar and another jar was the lottery jar. 
The participants were told that the donations would be made to UNICEF, a child-focused 
charity widely known among United States citizens. When participants chose to perform 
in the lottery, they had to wait till the end of the experiment to hear if they had won. There 
was a weighted participation, meaning that if someone decided to put one coin (ten cents) 
in the lottery they were four times less likely to win than when someone decides to put four 
coins (40 cents) in the lottery. This task had three conditions. In the first condition, the 
descriptive and prescriptive norm were the same, meaning that there was more money in 
the charity jar, whereas there was only some money in the lottery jar so that it became clear 
that most people donated their money to charity. See figure 3a. In the second condition, the 
descriptive and prescriptive norm were different, meaning that there was more money in 
the lottery jar. There was also some money in the charity jar so that it became clear that 
most people put their money in the lottery jar, see figure 3b. In the third and control 
condition, there was no descriptive norm, meaning that both jars had the same amount of 
money in it so that the participants did not have any additional information how others 
divided their money, see figure 3c.3  
Figure 3a. The money jars in the first condition: descriptive norm on charity 
 
Figure 3b. The money jars in the second condition: descriptive norm on lottery 
 
 
                                                 
3 The jars are based on a pre-study we conducted. 
Figure 3c. The money jars in the third and control condition: no descriptive norm 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Out of the 404 participants in this research, 131 where in the moral condition (with 43 in 
the descriptive norm charity condition, 44 in the descriptive norm lottery condition and 44 
in the no norm/control condition), 118 where in the immoral condition (with 45 in the 
descriptive norm charity condition, 33 in the descriptive norm lottery condition and 40 in 
the no norm/control condition), 155 where in the neutral/control condition (with 49 in the 
descriptive norm charity condition, 59 in the descriptive norm lottery condition and 47 in 
the no norm/control condition). On average, participants donated 13.6 cents (SD= 1.59) to 
charity with a minimum of 0 cents and a maximum of 50 cents and put 36.4 cents into the 
lottery (SD= 1.59) with minimum of 0 cents and a maximum of 50 cents. 
Manipulation check. 
Participants in the different groups (moral, immoral and neutral) differ significantly on 
positive (F(2,401)= 132.92, p< .00) and negative emotions (F(2,401)= 282.02, p< .00). 
Participants in the immoral condition had a higher mean on negative emotions (especially 
guilt, shame and bad feeling about self) then on positive emotions. Participants in the moral 
condition had a higher mean on positive emotions (especially good feeling about self and 
pride) then on the negative emotions. In the neutral conditions participants also felt more 
positive emotions then negative emotions but less outspoken then in the moral condition. 
See table 1.  
Table 1. Self-reported negative and positive emotions (Mean, (SD)) after recalling a moral, 
immoral or neutral memory on a 7point scale (1= not at all;7= very much).  
 Moral Immoral Neutral average 
Sadness 1.84 (1.51) 3.95 (1.89) 1.52 (1.09) 2.33 (1.82) 
Guilt 1.47 (1.20) 5.75 (1.40) 1.32 (.83) 2.66 (2.29) 
Disgust 1.54 (1.43) 3.83 (1.98) 1.53 (1.18) 2.21 (1.85) 
Shame 1.38 (1.13) 5.22 (1.72) 1.30 (1.00) 2.47 (2.19) 
Bad feeling about self 1.31 (.92) 5.19 (1.78) 1.57 (1.29) 2.54 (2.18) 
Anger 1.62 (1.50) 2.38 (1.67) 1.68 (1.33) 1.86 (1.52) 
Fear 1.39 (1.05) 2.60 (1.79) 1.47 (1.21) 1.77 (1.46) 
Happiness 4.69 (2.03) 1.67 (1.28) 3.82 (2.04) 3.48 (2.21) 
Good feeling about self 5.57 (1.74) 1.61 (1.13) 3.97 (2.07) 3.80 (2.33) 
Pleasure 4.26 (2.19) 1.58 (1.24) 3.54 (2.18) 3.20 (2.23) 
Satisfaction 4.26 (2.19) 1.69 (1.40) 4.23 (2.29) 3.86 (2.44) 
Pride 5.21 (1.89) 1.38 (.91) 2.99 (1.93) 3.24 (2.26) 
 
 
Results Hypotheses 
  To test hypothesis H1: The amount donated by a participant increases when the 
descriptive norm says you have to donate in comparison to when there is no norm, an 
ANOVA was performed with type of norm (no norm or descriptive norm on charity) as the 
independent variable and the amount donated as the dependent variable. There was no 
significant effect, F(1)= .615, p= .434. On average, when the descriptive norm said charity, 
participants donated 14.4 cents (SD= 1.59) and when there was no descriptive norm they 
donated 13.8 cents (SD= 1.61). See table 2. The hypothesis is rejected. 
  To test hypothesis H2: The amount donated by a participant is lower when the 
descriptive norm says you do not have to donate in comparison to when the descriptive 
norms says you have to donate, an ANOVA was performed with type of norm (descriptive 
norm on charity or descriptive norm on lottery) as the independent variable and the amount 
donated as the dependent variable. There was no significant effect, F(1)= 1.951, p= .164. 
On average, when the descriptive norm said lottery, participants donated 12.6 cents (SD= 
1.57) and when the descriptive norm said charity they donated 14.4 cents (SD= 1.59). See 
table 2. The hypothesis is rejected.  
  To test hypothesis H3: Being reminded of moral behavior creates self-licensing and 
reduces donating in comparison to being reminded of neutral behavior, there was an 
ANOVA performed with the amount donated as the independent variable and type of 
behavior (moral behavior or neutral behavior) as the dependent variable. There was no 
significant effect (F(1)= .119, p= .730). On average, when participants recalled moral 
behavior, they donated 12.9 cents (SD= 1.52) and when they recalled neutral behavior, they 
donated 13.6 cents (SD= 1.57). See table 2. The hypothesis is rejected. 
  To test hypothesis H4: Being reminded of immoral behavior increases donating in 
comparison to being reminded of neutral behavior, there was an ANOVA performed with 
type of behavior (immoral behavior or neutral behavior) as the independent variable and 
the amount donated as the dependent variable. There was no significant effect (F(1)= .162, 
p= .688). On average, when participants recalled immoral behavior, they donated 14.2 
cents (SD= 1.68) and when they recalled neutral behavior, they donated 13.6 cents (SD= 
1.57). See table 2. The hypothesis is rejected. 
  To test hypothesis H5: Being reminded of moral behavior decreases donating more 
when the descriptive norm states that you should go for self-interest instead of donating, 
there was an ANOVA performed with the type of norm (descriptive norm on charity, 
descriptive norm on lottery or no norms) as the independent variable and the amount 
donated as the dependent variable. This analysis was only performed on the participants in 
the moral condition. There was no significant effect (F(2)= .764, p = .468). On average, 
when the descriptive norm said lottery, participants donated 11.8 cents (SD= 1.60), when 
the descriptive norm said charity they donated 15.3 cents (SD= 1.59) and when there was 
no norm they donated 11.8 cents (SD= 1.40). See table 2. The hypothesis is rejected. 
  To test hypothesis H6: Being reminded of immoral behavior increases donating 
more when the norms state you should donate then when they state that you should go for 
self-interest, there was an ANOVA performed with the type of norm (descriptive norm on 
lottery, descriptive on charity or no norm) as the independent variable and the amount 
donated as the dependent variable. This analysis was only performed on the participants in 
the immoral condition. There was no significant effect (F(2)= .303, p= .739). On average, 
when the descriptive norm said lottery, participants donated 13 cents (SD= 1.67), when the 
descriptive norm said charity they donated 14 cents (SD= 1.70) and when there was no 
norm they donated 16 cents (SD= 1.68). See table 2c. The hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Table 2. The average amount and standard deviations of dollar cents donated by 
participants as a function of the different morality conditions, descriptive norms and a 
interaction of the different morality conditions and the descriptive norms.  
  Moral Immoral Neutral Total 
Descriptive norm lottery Mean $00.12 $00.13 $00.12 $00.13 
 SD 1.60 1.67 1.52 1.57 
Descriptive norm charity Mean $00.15 $00.14 $00.16 $00.14 
 SD 1.59 1.70 1.54 1.59 
No descriptive norm Mean $00.12 $00.16 $00.13 $00.14 
 SD 1.40 1.68 1.67 1.61 
Total Mean $00.13 $00.14 $00.14 $00.14 
 SD 1.52 1.68 1.57 1.59 
 
Explorative analyses 
  Based on the results of Effron et al. (2010), who found that moral licensing occurred 
when the moral behavior was in a different domain then the subsequent immoral behavior 
we decided to test if the type of immoral behavior has any influence on the amount donated. 
We split the immoral group up into four different groups: Cheating (n= 20), illegal 
behavior (n= 25), lying or betraying (n= 36) and other behavior (n= 34). An ANOVA was 
performed with these groups as the independent variable and the amount donated as the 
dependent variable. There was no significant effect (F(3)= 1.54, p= .21). 
  Balakrishnan, Palma, Patenaude and Campbell (2017) found that a higher SES 
leads to less unethical behavior. To test if this is true and to see if perceived socioeconomic 
status has any influence on the amount donated, a regression analysis was performed with 
the socioeconomic status as the independent variable and the amount donated as the 
dependent variable. There was no significant effect (β= -0.72, t(403)= 
 -.472, p= 0.14). 
  Based on the results of Smith and Knudson (2016), who found that millennials 
engaged in more immoral behavior then non-millennials we wanted to see if this had any 
influence on our research. To test if age has any influence on the amount donated we 
performed a regression analysis with age as the independent variable and the amount 
donated as the dependent variable. There was no significant effect (β=- 0.00, t(403)= 
 -.003, p= 1.00). 
   
Discussion 
  The goal of the current research was to find out if the effect of moral and immoral 
behavior on charitable behavior is influenced by descriptive norms. There were three main 
findings. First, we found that there was no significant difference in donating between 
varying descriptive norms. This means that with the charity condition participants did not 
donate more than in the lottery or control condition and the participants in de lottery 
condition did not donate less than the participants in the other conditions. Second, we did 
not find any significant evidence for self-licensing or moral cleansing. The participants in 
the immoral condition did not seem to feel guilty enough to compensate their immoral 
behavior and thus donate more. The participants in the moral condition did not donate 
significantly less than the participants in the immoral and control group. Third the effect 
of moral and immoral behavior on charitable behavior is not significantly influenced by 
descriptive norms.  
Implications of the First Finding 
  The first finding was that there is no significant difference in donating behavior by 
using varying descriptive norms. There is no significant connection found between a 
descriptive norm (either donating or lottery) and donating behavior. This is in contrast with 
H1 (The amount donated by a participant increases when the descriptive norm says you 
have to donate in comparison to when there is no norm) and H2 (The amount donated by 
a participant is lower when the descriptive norm says you do not have to donate in 
comparison to when the descriptive norms says you have to donate) and is not in line with 
the research of Cialdini et al. (1990) who found that when the descriptive and prescriptive 
norm differ, people were more likely to follow the current existing descriptive norm then 
the prescriptive norm they should follow. It is also not in line with the research of Keizer 
et al. (2008) who found that when the prescriptive and descriptive norm contradict each 
other, people tend to follow the descriptive norm. 
  This would mean in the current research that when the descriptive norms were 
followed; the more money there would be in either the lottery jar or de charity jar the more 
likely participants were to put money in that specific jar as well. Our research did show 
that participants put more money in the lottery jar when the descriptive norm suggested 
that they should put their money in the lottery jar. However our participants did this in the 
control and charity conditions, were the descriptive norm did not suggested to put the 
money in the lottery jar, as well. Overall the participant were more inclined to put their 
money in the lottery jar no matter what type of descriptive norm they faced. However on 
average the participants in all different conditions donated in the direction that was 
hypothesized. Meaning that the participants in the lottery condition donated the least, 
followed by the participants in the control condition and the participants in the charity 
condition donated the most. However these results were not significant because all 
conditions put the majority of money in the lottery. This means that in our research people 
did not follow the descriptive norm or the prescriptive norm. If they had followed the 
prescriptive norm everyone would have donated the majority of their coins. And when the 
descriptive norm was followed there would be a difference between the different 
conditions.   
This probably happened because participants did not feel the pressure of the 
prescriptive norms. There was no one who could see if they kept the money or donated it 
so they choose the option they could personally profit the most of. This sense of anonymity 
is probably of great influence on the way people felt like they had to follow the norms. 
Kirchler, Huber, Stefan and Sutter (2015) found that people acted more moral when they 
were not anonymous. They state that this result occurs because people feel that they can be 
held responsible for their actions when they are not anonymous. They did not find this 
result when the participants were not anonymous and had a shared responsibility for the 
outcome. What also could have happened is that the participants might not have seen the 
descriptive norms due to technical limitations. The jars were on top of the screen and the 
participants had to drag coins in a box underneath the jars when they scrolled down on their 
computer. They might not have spent enough attention to the jars to notice that there was 
a difference between them and thus did not notice the descriptive norms.  
  That participants did not follow the descriptive norm could be because although 
descriptive norms work, they only work in very specific conditions. Previous research did 
not examine charity or the fact that participants actually have something materialistic to 
gain when they do not follow descriptive norms. In the current research descriptive norms 
did not work because people felt like they lose the chance to win more money if they donate 
to charity (and thus follow the descriptive norm in some conditions). 
Implications of the Second Finding 
The second finding was that there was no evidence for self-licensing or moral 
cleansing. There was no significant effect of the memory of past moral or immoral behavior 
on donating behavior. This means that the memory of moral behavior did not lead to 
significantly less donating. Participants did not feel excused by their past moral behavior 
and thus self-licensing did not occur. It also means that the memory of immoral behavior 
did not lead to significantly more donating behavior. Participants did not feel the need to 
compensate their immoral behavior and thus moral cleansing did not occur. This is in 
contrast with H3 (Being reminded of moral behavior creates self-licensing and reduces 
donating in comparison to being reminded of neutral behavior) and H4 (Being reminded 
of immoral behavior creates moral cleansing and increases donating in comparison to 
being reminded of neutral behavior) and is not in line with previous researches of Merritt 
et al. (2010) and Sachdeva et al. (2009) who found that individuals who are reminded of 
their moral past behavior are less likely to engage in pro social behavior, like donating, and 
are more likely to engage in behavior that serves self-interest, like participating in a lottery. 
It was also not in line with the research of Tetlock et al. (2000) who found that when you 
behave immoral you are more likely to make yourself feel better by behaving moral. 
In our research the majority of the money went to the lottery jar with no significant 
difference between the moral and immoral condition. One possible explanation for this is 
that participants felt less immoral about these memories because they did not have to take 
responsibility for their action. They wrote them down for themselves and they knew 
someone else was going to read their memories but this person was so distant that it gave 
them a sense of anonymity that didn’t require them to take responsibility and change their 
behavior. This theory is strengthen by the fact that in the informed consent at the beginning 
of the questionnaire we mention that the current research is conducted by Leiden 
University, The Netherlands, which even confirms that the researchers who are going to 
read your memory are far away.    
 A possible other explanation is that participants did not feel like they had to 
compensate. Effron et al. (2015) found that moral cleansing mostly occurs when someone 
is actively looking for something to proof that they are not immoral. Our participants were 
forced to remember their immoral behavioral and they were in no way actively seeking for 
proof that they were not immoral, however they did feel worse in the immoral condition 
then in the moral and neutral condition. Other research with the same manipulation did find 
compensation behavior, but in most researches, like the research of Jordan et al. (2011), 
this was an imaginary scenario. 
Implications of the Third Finding 
The third finding was that the effect of moral and immoral behavior on charitable 
behavior is not significantly influenced by descriptive norms. There was no significant 
result for the effect of moral behavior on donating being influenced by descriptive norms. 
There was also no significant result for the effect of immoral behavior on donating being 
influenced by descriptive norms. This is in contrast with H5 (Being reminded of moral 
behavior decreases donating more when the descriptive norm states that you should go for 
self-interest instead of donating) and H6 (Being reminded of immoral behavior increases 
donating more when the norms state you should donate then when they state that you 
should go for self-interest) and is not in line with our expectations. Based on the results we 
cannot say that descriptive norms strengthen the influence of moral and immoral behavior. 
 In our research the majority of the money was put in to the lottery jar, both the 
descriptive norm and moral behavior did not seem to have influence on this. Being 
reminded of moral behavior did decreased donating slightly more when the descriptive 
norm stated that you should go for the lottery instead of donating but this difference was 
not significant. The same goes for being reminded of immoral behavior, this increased 
donating slightly more when the norms stated that you should donate then when they stated 
that you should go for self-interest. This difference is also not significant and even smaller 
than the difference with moral behavior. 
A possible explanation for this is that because the majority of our participants were 
not donating at all, the differences were also not that big. And if they donated more the 
differences would have been clearer and might even be significant 
Limitations and Further Research   
  Although the current research was carefully planned, some limitations were found 
after conducting it. Probably the major limitation in this research is our participant pool. 
The participants were all participating in this research to make money, none of them solely 
participated in research because they liked to participate or want to contribute to science. 
As one of the participants pointed out when we asked them were they thought the research 
was about; they have to pay taxes over the money they make from participating in research. 
Because of this they probably see participating more as a job and are more focused on 
making money than on donating. 189 of the 404 participants (46.8%) in this study gave 
nothing to charity and thus put everything in the lottery while just 24 of the 404 participants 
(5.9%) put everything in the charity jars and thus nothing in the lottery. Obviously there 
were also participants who did not only participate to make as much money as possible, 
but for quite a few that was the only reason to participate and none of them is earning 
something by putting their money into the charity jar.  
Another possibility is that the amount to be won was too large. The participants 
participate in most researches for 2 or 3 dollars, while with participating in this research 
they had the chance to make the same amount of money as they would make while 
participating in almost hundred study’s. The amount of the reward was too large and it 
would have been better if the reward was smaller were for example a few participants 
would get 20 dollars instead of just one participant to win the entire amount. With a smaller 
price in the lottery there is not this large amount to be won, and participants might feel like 
they do not lose their chance to win a lot of money when they donate to charity. 
 In the current research we asked participants to take a risk. If we had given them 
the choice between donating or keeping 50 cents instead of a chance on a large amount 
then more people would have donated because 50 cents is not that much to lose. Now 
participants might felt the step to donate was too large because they could relatively win 
so much. So in this case when you follow the descriptive norm and donate your money it 
is actually in your disadvantage. This might make participants less inclined to follow the 
descriptive norm. 
 Kallgren, Reno and Cialdini (2000) found in their research that when a person was 
focused on them self their personal norms overruled the descriptive norms. This could 
mean in our research that most participants actually followed their own personal norms at 
that moment because they were focused on themselves after they just had to recall a 
memory about their own life and think about their own feelings. However the research of 
Jordan et al. (2011), which had the same manipulation, did not face this problem. This 
could be because personal norms are about their own gains because our participants were 
working while participating and they tried to make as much money as possible while the 
participants of Jordan et al. (2011) were acting in an imaginary scenario. Were the 
participants in the current research had to donate or keep real money, they only asked about 
the likelihood of donating to charity. 
 Another limitation was that the neutral condition turned out to be not so neutral 
after all. A lot of participants saw going to the supermarket as a fun trip outside of the 
house. An example from one of the participants in the neutral condition was; “I was excited 
to get my shopping done when I walked in, and was hungry. There was a lot on offer in the 
supermarket, and there were a lot of really good bargains. This excited me even more. I 
was very happy to see I would be able to get a lot of groceries for a very cheap price. I 
ended up buying about a week's worth of food and spending much less than usual, so I was 
overjoyed”. But there were also participants who had negative emotions, one participant 
for example felt really sad because their favorite store was closing down. Of course, there 
were participants to whom this memory was neutral but quite a few had strong positive or 
negative emotions about going to the supermarket. On average participants in the neutral 
condition almost felt the same as participants in the moral condition on the negative 
emotions and satisfaction. On the other positive emotions they rated their feelings as less 
strong then the participants in the moral condition. This means that the control group was 
not quite as neutral as would be ideal and that they are not quite as good as a baseline as 
could be. 
Because this was an online experiment, there was not a lot of control how the 
participants took the research and how serious they were about it. Also if you take a lot of 
researches like this, you get to know how experiments work. We asked participants what 
they thought the research was about and a few of them guessed that dividing the money in 
the jars was part of the experiment. When participants feel like dividing the money is part 
of the experiment they think more about what the best way to divide it is which might have 
made the manipulation less effective. 
  Because of these limitations further research should be conducted. It would be 
interesting to see if there is an interaction effect between norms and donating behavior 
when further research is not conducted online but in a face-to-face setting. This will take 
away the effects that anonymity has and also gives the opportunity to control for 
background disturbances. It would be interesting to see if there is an effect when the amount 
to be won in lottery is much smaller, like where a number of participants, based on the 
amount that is put in the lottery, get a maximum of 20 dollars. This is still a lot more then 
they get from just participating but it is not an overwhelming amount, that makes 
participants focus on nothing else. In a follow-up it would also be interesting to see what 
happens if you eliminate the lottery all together. If participants can just choose to keep their 
50 cents or donate them, the results might also be completely different. Money wise 
participants do not really gain anything from keeping their money, so in that case it might 
not be seen as a real disadvantage to donate and make the gap between donating and 
winning 200 dollars in a lottery a lot smaller. In an ideal research participants should donate 
in a research setting were they have to actually divide the money between real jars instead 
of online jars, because then there are no technical limitations due to which participants miss 
the norms. The participants should also participate in the research for something else then 
money such as credits so that they do not participate in researches for the financial gain. 
Lastly the participants should tell their past behavior to the researcher instead of writing it 
down so that they feel less anonymous. With descriptive norms and (im)moral behavior 
there are a lot of possibilities and it would be interesting to see what further research will 
find about this. 
Conclusion  
  The goal of the current research was to find out if the effect of moral and immoral 
behavior on charitable behavior is influenced by descriptive norms. We did not find any 
effect of moral and immoral behavior on donating and we also did not find any effect for 
the influence of descriptive norms. This is not in line with other researches, who at least 
found an effect of moral and immoral behavior on donating. The fact that this research was 
not corresponding with previous research is probably due to the participant pool, but it 
could also mean that there is no effect between memory recalling and donating behavior. 
This seems unlikely because multiple researches found these results. What this could mean 
is that memory recalling gives results but only in specific circumstances, which the current 
research did not meet. The current research has slightly different conditions then the 
previous conducted researches, which could be the reason why our research did not have 
significant results. The conclusion to draw is that further research is necessary to further 
explore the hidden constructs lying under the effects of memory recalling and the influence 
on donating behavior. 
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